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ABSTRACT
In this work, we propose an approach for recognition of com-
promised Twitter accounts based on Authorship Verifica-
tion. Our solution can detect accounts that became com-
promised by analysing their user writing styles. This way,
when an account content does not match its user writing
style, we affirm that the account has been compromised,
similar to Authorship Verification. Our approach follows
the profile-based paradigm and uses N-grams as its kernel.
Then, a threshold is found to represent the boundary of an
account writing style. Experiments were performed using
a subsampled dataset from Twitter. Experimental results
showed that the developed model is very suitable for compro-
mised recognition of Online Social Networks accounts due to
the capability of recognize user styles over 95% accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.7 [Natural Language Processing]: Text analysis; I.5.4
[Applications]: Text processing; K.4.2 [Social Issues]:
Abuse and crime involving computers
General Terms
Measurement, Security, Verification
Keywords
Authoship Verification, Compromised Accounts, N-grams
1. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are environments where
people discuss and express thoughts and opinions about any
subject [26]. Currently, OSNs represent a relevant resource
of information and researches in areas such as Customer Re-
lationship Management (CRM) and Opnion Mining (OM).
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Knowledge obtained from OSNs such as Twitter and Fa-
cebook has shown to be extremely valuable for marketing
research companies, public opinion organisations, and other
Text Mining purposes [1, 25, 28, 19]. Since millions of opini-
ons on a certain topic are expressed with simplicity, posting
provide rich, easy and unbiased content comprehension [9].
Therefore, the contents of OSNs are a valuable dataset for
decision making on marketing research, business intelligence,
stock market prediction and image monitoring [15, 10].
The OSNs wide popularity and ease of access have resulted
in the misuse of their services. In addition to the privacy
preserving issues, OSNs face the challenge of dealing with
undesirable users and their malicious activities, spamming
for product promotion being one of the most common [2]. To
address the problem of malicious activity on social networks,
researchers have focused the detection of fake accounts (i.e.,
automatically created accounts for only spreading malicious
content). However, the problem persists once systems that
solely detect fake accounts do not discriminate between fake
and compromised accounts. A compromised account is a
legitimate account which has been taken over by an attac-
ker to publish fake and harmful content 1 2. Accounts can
be compromised in many different ways, for example, by
exploiting a cross-site scripting vulnerability or by using a
phishing scam to steal the users credentials. Also, bots have
been increasingly used to obtain credentials information for
social networking sites on infected hosts [6, 8].
Since fake accounts were mainly created with proposal to
cause harm in OSNs, once they are detected, the simplest
solution is to delete them. In the meantime, compromised
accounts need engaging in a credentials recovery process to
give back the accounts control to their respective owners [6].
Moreover, a study performed through Twitter revealed that
only 16% of the spamming accounts were indeed fake ac-
counts, while the remaining quantity were all compromised
accounts [8]. The same reality also was seen on Facebook
where 97% of malicious accounts were not originally created
to solely spamming porpose [7].
In this paper, we present a first of its kind study to recog-
nize compromised accounts using just text as resource. Our
approach is based on N-grams Authorship Verification (AV)
and we focus on recognition of a user based on its writing
1http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30853311
2http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30785232
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style. When the writing style of a given user does not match
its boundary based on a threshold, then, a warning alarm
could be sent out to inform the account owner and mali-
cious posts could be blocked. Also, as seen in [13, 23, 15]
Preprocessing can either contribute or disturb text mining
tasks, therefore, we also conducted experiments concerning
Preprocessing and Corpus size to study their relevance in
results. Our experiments were performed using a Twitter
dataset and results ranging from 94% to 95% accuracy were
achieved.
The remaining of the work is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents an overview towards compromised accounts
and Authorship Verification along N-grams. In Section 3
details about the proposed aproach are described. Section
4 presents the experimental settings to perform our tests.
Section 5 discusses our results. Section 6 states our conclu-
sions.
2. RELATEDWORK
Compromised accounts initially became the object of rese-
arch interest in e-mail and web services as seen in [22, 12]. In
a similar scenario to OSNs, users credentials are stolen using
malicious link or phishing techniques [14, 22]. Concerning
e-mails, researches already conducted work in user levels by
using social engineering to emphasize user awareness [12],
while another different approach combined network infor-
mation, machine learning and content analysis in order to
detect harmful content [22].
Some other approaches detected intrusion and compro-
mised accounts in short messages by applying text mining
techniques as Authorship Attribution (AA) and AV [5, 4].
Their main contribution was to aid the search for cyber cri-
minals [27] or to increase cyber space security and reliability
[5].
In order to achieve so, both AA and AV were based on one
of two strategies: Stylometry and N-grams. The first one
describes text content through attributes which represent
writing-style markers as lexical, syntactic, content-specific,
and idiosyncratic style markers. Lexical attributes are words
and character based statistical measures like sentence length.
Syntatic attributes include part-of-speech tagger measures.
Content-specific attributes are represented by keywords of
a given text and idiosyncratic markers are represented by
misspellings and grammatical mistakes [11, 18].
N-grams, on the other hand, consist in obtaining frequent
co-ocorrent patterns in words or character level. A set of
most frequent N-grams represents the textual description of
a given author, hoping that most frequent patterns would
occur more often [13, 21].
Regarding the few existent works addressing compromi-
sed accounts on OSNs, studies already stated that malicious
content are almost completely spread by compromised ac-
counts that were victims of phishing attacks. The detection
of malicious accounts is achieved by extracting features from
text, webdata and network information to then, classify it
based on machine learning approaches like Random Forest,
SVM and Logistic Regression [7, 20].
3. PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed approach is grounded on AV to analyse if
an account has been compromised. In order to represent the
legitimate user, it is necessary to extract features from tex-
Figure 1: Proposed Approach for User Threshold Estimation
tual content. These contents are calculated using N-grams,
as seen in in Figure 1.
The main idea behind our proposal is to address compro-
mised accounts problem as a document representation mo-
del. By doing so, it would be possible to apply Text Mining
tasks to analyze the user writing style.
First step is dataset acquisition. Considering Text Mining
approach only text features will be used and, therefore, none
additional information beyond the tweets content and their
respective authors username are required for our proposal.
Second step is about Cleaning. Normally, it would be
possible to consider any textual content as a part of a do-
cument produced by an author. However, as this approach
is created to be applied on Twitter users, links and retweets
(thirdy part contents) were removed due to not represent
any textual authorship mark.
All remaining text productions are considered authorship
samples. Therefore, all contents are concatenated cumulati-
vely following the profile-based paradigm described in [17].
The result of this step, called Profiling, is a document con-
taining all terms writen by the user.
Then, in Profile Setup, each user is represented as a do-
cument whose content is subsampled at the same fraction in
two distinct parts: Baseline set and Thresholding set. Each
fraction of document subsampled has the same size and is
interspersed as shown in Figure 1. This way, subjects discus-
sed by the user during the time will be equally distributed in
both sets. This is important to our approach because both
sets must have subjects balanced so that the boundary of
the writing style can be properly found.
The Baseline set is the text portion which represents user
account. This set is used to extract the usual writing style of
an user and is kept as one single document as described by
the profile-based paradigm in [17]. The Thresholding set is
a portion used to find a Simplified Profile Intersection (SPI)
threshold to delimitate the user writing style and different
from Baseline set, each portion subsampled becomes an dis-
tinct sample instance. The SPI similarity measure was used
in [17, 13] and is stated to be suitable to diferent sample
XI Brazilian Symposium on Information System, Goiaˆnia, GO, May 26-29, 2015.
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sizes. The SPI is calculated as seen in Equation 1, where N1
and N2 are two distinct sets of N-grams. Note that SPI is
basically a count of N-grams that exist in both sets.
SPI(N1, N2) = |N1 ∩N2| (1)
After Profile Setup process, Preprocessing techniques can
be performed to improve the effectiveness of our approach.
In this work, we explore some combination of Preprocessing
concerning precision and accuracy to recognize accounts tex-
tual content.
In order to obtain the SPI threshold in Writing Style Ex-
tracion step, most frequents N-grams are extracted from Ba-
seline set and most frequents N-grams are also extracted
from each fraction in Thresholding set. Then, SPI is used to
calculate similarity between Baseline set and Thresholding
set N-grams. The minimal similarity obtained is conside-
red the SPI threshold. Any future portion of text posted
in this account that presents similarity measure lesser than
threshold is considered an intrusion and the account is com-
promised.
4. METHODOLOGY
Twitter, the OSN used in this work, is known as a mi-
cro blogging service. Unlike other social media, Twitter is
known by short posts (140 characters at maximum) done by
users expressing thoughts, opinions and feelings [26]. These
short texts, named tweets, are available publicly as default,
and are immediately broadcasted to the users followers [3].
Figure 2: Experimental Settings Overview
The Twitter Developer Team offer a streaming service
that delivers other developers low latency access to Twit-
ter’s global stream of data. The tweets sets used as samples
in our experiments were collected by [24] using this service.
In our experiments, only a subsample from original Da-
taset was used. This was done in order to simulate the few
samples available in a more critical scenario. From this part,
all tweets were grouped by authors username cumulatively
following profiling step described in Section 3. As specified
in our approach, links and retweets were removed since they
do not infer any information about its user writting pattern.
All remaining textual content was included in our tests.
In Figure 2, gray parts represent the experimental set-
tings. The Profile Setup process was performed to separate
textual contents in 3 distincts parts: Baseline set, Threshol-
ding set (as proposed in Section 3) and Test set. The last set
is used to evaluate our method’s efficiency and is a represen-
tation of future portions of text posted. The user’s Test set
is completelly used along randomly selected Test set instan-
ces from other users to check how adequate is the obtained
threshold. Our intention to use other users test set among
the own user test set is to simulate a situation where the le-
gitimate account has been compromised and harmful posts
are writen, therefore, it is desirable to obtain SPI measures
in instances from other users test set lesser than threshold,
while own user test set are intended to present SPI greater
than threshold.
Another concerning towards the Profile setup is to study
the size of each splited part. This is considered an impor-
tant issue of this work once the size used presenting better
results would be the amount of words necessary to recognize
accounts textual contents. In our experiments, were used 11
difrent sizes ranging from 50 to 100 words.
Also, concerning Preprocessing, 4 tests concerning their
influence were performed: a) Raw (i.e, no preprocessing), b)
Hashtags and Citations removal, c) Stopwords removal and
d) Combinated preprocessing (i.e, Hashtags, Citations and
Stopwords removal). The idea behind these tests is to study
the influence of disposable terms concerning precision and
accuracy to recognize account textual content.
One last issue experienced in our tests was the N used
on N-grams. Following results from [13] we used values to
N equals to 4, 5 and 6. These setting were also applied
including the Corpus size and preprocessing settings.
Therefore, the complete experimental setting consists in
132 experiments covering our 3 diferent N-grams values, 11
combination towards Corpus size the 4 combination dealing
2 preprocessing techniques.
In order to keep experiments always balanced to enable
comparisons to each other, we defined that each Test set
and Threshold set were composed by 10 instances of same
size (ranging from 50 to 100 words). In the Evaluation step,
the user being recognized always used its entire Test set (i.e,
10 instances of text) along 10 instances randomly selected
from other users Test sets.
To evaluate our method eficiency, we used 4 well known
statiscal measures found in [16] and their equations are shown
in Table 1 where TP are user test set instances presenting
SPI greater than threshold, TN are other users test set pre-
senting SPI lesser than threshold, FN are user test instan-
ces presenting SPI lesser than threshold and FP are other
users test intances presenting SPI greater than threshold.
Analysis results and discussion towards all experiments are
presented in Section 5.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As described previously, 132 experiments were performed
concerning all possible combinations withinN = 4, 5, 6; Cor-
pus size in each splited portion ranged from 50 to 100 words
XI Brazilian Symposium on Information System, Goiaˆnia, GO, May 26-29, 2015.
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Table 1: Measures used to evaluate recognition rate
Name Equation
Precision TP
TP+FP
Accuracy TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
False Negative Rate FN
FN+TP
True Negative Rate TN
TN+FP
Table 3: The influence of text Preprocessing techniques on
compromised accounts recognition
Preprocessing Mean Standard
Deviation
Raw 91.90% 7.21%
Hashtags/Citations
Removal 86.10% 10.56%
Stopwords Removal 95.80% 8.78%
Combinated Preproc. 85.22% 12.15%
and 4 combinations of text preprocessing. Table 2a and 2b
shows our highest and lowest results in accuracy terms in-
dependently of its setting. It is notable that the top settings
achieved excelent results, ranging from 94.10% to 95.80%
accuracy (i,e. correctly classified instances) and also presen-
tend excelent results in terms of true negative rate ranging
from 88.40% to 91.60% which indicates that our method is
capable of infer when the content does not correspond to its
legitimate user writting pattern.
Another important issue to be observed is the combinati-
ons of preprocessing in both Table 2a and Table 2b. All 10
top results achived their results without removing hashtags
and citations. On the other hand, all 10 least accurate ex-
periments applied hashtags and citations removal achieving
poor results. Our first conclusion by overviewing the ex-
periments is that hashtags and citations carry information
about the writting style of an user textual content, once they
indicate subjects discussed and people frequently contacted.
Still concerning the preprocessing issue, a detailed result
from the top 1 experimental setting in Table 2a using Cor-
pus size = 100 and N = 6 is shown in Table 3 in terms of
accuracy. Just by removing hashtags and citations, a loss in
accuracy is found, falling from 91.90% to 86.10% precision.
By removing only stopwords it is still possible to increase
5.0% accuracy. This implies that pronouns, articles and pre-
positions used do not help to recognize an user writing style
using our approach. One last observation about preproces-
sing is: a combination of hashtags/citations and stopwords
removal achives the lowest results of the 4 combinations once
it uses only a little part of writing not including stopwords,
hashtags and citations.
A discusion towards the top 1 setting in Table 2a is ilustra-
ted by Figure 3 and shows accuracy considering each user.
The setting achieved 100% of correctly recognized in many
cases, however, to account number 4, 15, 25 and 27 obtained
accuracy bellow 80%. These users presented a very unsta-
ble writing style using a high quantity of prepositions and
almost nothing of jargons and emoticons making their writ-
ting dificult to distinguish. In all other cases the setting
obtained satisfactory results.
Corpus size influence on our approach is illustrated by
Figure 4. Before any discussion about this view, it is neces-
Figure 3: Individual accuracy on recognition of compromi-
sed accounts
sary to observe that the Corpus size is not used only to split
in Profile Setup process, but also implies in the number of
words necessary to perform proposed approach with satisfac-
tory results. Considering so, the fact that none setting size
used in our experiments presented ourliers and also presen-
ted balanced quartiles, having a good result. It implies that
our method have a stable range of accuracy independently
of amount of text used. A descending gradient observed on
accuracy using 100 to 50 words is justifiable once less words
also means less n-grams to be extracted and possibly less
accuracy. Therefore, the boxplot states that the most con-
siderable size to be used in our dataset is 100 words while
the most inapropriate is 50.
Figure 4: The influence of Corpus size on baseline accuracy
One last consideration towards our approach is threshold
value and its relation to each user writing style. Most part of
users obtained 100% accuracy as shown in Figure 3. These
users are represented in Figure 5, as Case III, where the ob-
tained threshold is suitable to separate writing styles from
the legitimate user and other users. Case I and II represent
users that by presenting too many stopwords as part of their
writing styles and using a small quantity of emoticons, jar-
gons, hashtags or citations obtained a threshold value unable
to correctly separate writing styles and, therefore, obtained
a signicant number of false negative (i.e, writing style from
different users being recognized as the user in question).
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
XI Brazilian Symposium on Information System, Goiaˆnia, GO, May 26-29, 2015.
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Table 2: Overview on accounts recognition accuracy
(a) Top results in accuracy
N C. Size Precision Accuracy TNR FNR Hashtags/Citations Stopwords
6 100 93.97% 95.80% 91.60% 0.00% Not removed Removed
5 100 93.43% 95.70% 91.40% 0.00% Not removed Removed
6 95 93.59% 95.50% 91.00% 0.00% Not removed Removed
6 90 93.64% 95.30% 90.80% 0.20% Not removed Removed
5 90 93.36% 95.10% 90.40% 0.02% Not removed Removed
6 70 92.72% 95.00% 90.20% 0.02% Not removed Removed
4 100 92.28% 94.60% 89.20% 0.00% Not removed Removed
5 70 92.45% 94.60% 89.40% 0.02% Not removed Removed
6 85 92.57% 94.20% 89.00% 0.06% Not removed Removed
5 95 91.39% 94.10% 88.40% 0.02% Not removed Removed
(b) Lowest results in accuracy
N C. Size Precision Accuracy TNR FNR Hashtags/Citations Stopwords
6 55 72.31% 77.60% 55.40% 0.20% Removed Removed
6 65 73.75% 77.40% 61.20% 6.40% Removed Not removed
6 50 75.08% 77.20% 63.20% 8.80% Removed Not removed
4 60 75.47% 77.10% 64.40% 10.20% Removed Not removed
4 70 74.53% 76.70% 61.80% 8.40% Removed Not removed
4 55 71.73% 76.60% 53.80% 0.60% Removed Removed
5 50 74.03% 76.10% 60.60% 8.40% Removed Not removed
4 50 73.89% 75.60% 60.20% 9.00% Removed Not removed
4 55 71.30% 74.70% 55.80% 6.40% Removed Not removed
6 55 70.97% 73.80% 55.40% 7.80% Removed Not removed
5 55 70.62% 73.30% 55.00% 8.40% Removed Not removed
Figure 5: Threshold testing for compromised accounts re-
cognition
One advantage from our approach is that only text is used
as resource once it is grounded on Text Mining. Although
it was tested on Twitter in our experiments, our developed
method is applicable in any OSN. Also, due to the fact that
this work is the first to depend only on text to recognize
compromised accounts, our approach concerned about the
Corpus size necessary to recognize compromised accounts,
desirable preprocessing to obtain better results and which N
use in N-grams calculation to improve the approach results.
In this work one important consideration during the en-
tire process is that warning systems should not incorrectly
recognize a legitimate user as an invasor to claim compromi-
sed account. Therefore, we studied and comproved that the
top experimental setting presented in Table 2a (N=6, Cor-
pus size = 100, Stopwords removal only) obtains very good
results in terms not only of precision and accuracy, but also
very few occurrences of false negative. That implies that
our method would rarely claim compromised accounts by
content when actually it was not compromised.
Considering Twitter’s very short texts scenario, the need
to use 100 words is also aceptable. The tweets used in ex-
periments have a mean of 14.6 words. In practice, between
6-10 tweets, depending of how much per tweets is writen, is
possible to recognize an user by its text, with 95% accuracy
along 91% true negatives.
For future works it would be of great interest to study a
method dealing only with those cases of low accuracy pre-
sentend in Figure 5 and Figure 3. This way, our methods
accuracy could be increase. This study could be towards
other N-grams measures focused on special cases of authors.
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